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Abstract:
Parametric and nonparametric market power tests most commonly used to assess imperfectly
competitive behavior are identified.  Monte Carlo experiments are used to evaluate the accuracy of
eight nonparametric market power tests.  The results are compared to Raper, Love, and Shumway’s
(1997) findings concerning three parametric market power tests in the Bresnahan-Lau tradition.  Both
monopolistic and monopsonistic market power tests are implemented using data from ten known
market structures.  Only two of the nonparametric market power tests distinguish between market
structures adequately.  The parametric tests perform well, although functional form bias is not
investigated in this study.
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INTRODUCTION
Three major approaches have developed within New Empirical Industrial Organization
(NEIO) to measure market power exertion: parametric, nonstructural, and nonparametric market
power tests.  Parametric and nonparametric market power tests are discussed in this study.  Both
approaches develop from profit maximization assumptions.  The parametric approach econometrically
estimates market power by parameterizing the monopoly (monopsony) markup (markdown) term
((Appelbaum, 1979), (Bresnahan, 1982), (Lau, 1982)).  Parametric tests yield testable hypotheses
regarding market power exertion.  However, these hypotheses depend on the functional form chosen
for the underlying model.
The nonparametric approach to market power measurement is relatively new and developed
in response to criticisms of the parametric approach ((Ashenfelter and Sullivan, 1987), (Lambert,
1994), (Love and Shumway, 1994), (Driscoll, et al., 1997)).  Deterministic nonparametric tests are
an exhaustive search for violations of the given hypothesis.  In contrast to parametric tests,
nonparametric tests do not require ad hoc specifications of functional form so the problem of testing
joint hypotheses is avoided.  They instead rely on raw data using algebraic techniques.  Additionally,
less data is required than for parametric tests because opposing supply or demand curves are not
needed.  However, deterministic nonparametric tests are not imbedded in a stochastic framework.
This can result in the possible rejection of hypotheses that are only violated once because the
magnitude of violations is not considered.
Various authors ((Sullivan, 1985), (Ashenfelter and Sullivan, 1987), (Hyde and Perloff,
1995)) argue the merits of each type of market power test, but to date no comprehensive comparison
of the tests’ performance has been conducted.  For comparison of performance, it is necessary to￿
apply the tests to data where the degree of market power exertion is known.  This is accomplished
via Monte Carlo experiments.  Only Hyde and Perloff (1994, 1995) and Raper, Love, and Shumway
(1997) use this technique to compare the accuracy of market power tests.  Hyde and Perloff compare
parametric and nonstructural market power tests, while Raper, Love, and Shumway assess the
accuracy of traditional NEIO models (Bresnahan-Lau approach) under misspecification of market
structure.
In this study we use the Monte Carlo data set developed by Raper, Love, and Shumway
(1997) to implement selected nonparametric market power tests in estimating the degree of market
power exertion using simulated data from ten different market structures, including perfect
competition, monopoly, monopsony, Cournot and Stackelberg oligopoly and oligopsony, and three
forms of cooperative bilateral monopoly.  We then compare performance of these nonparametric tests
with the performance of Bresnahan-Lau type parametric market power tests using our results and
those of Raper, Love, and Shumway (1997).  Only for Love and Shumway’s (1994) test and its
monopoly counterpart, we obtain results sufficiently close to the true value of market power exertion
in the market to recommend it for use with real data.
NONPARAMETRIC TESTS
Eight deterministic nonparametric market power tests are investigated in this study.
Ashenfelter and Sullivan (1985) were the first to develop and apply a nonparametric market power
test.  They construct a deterministic nonparametric test of the monopoly model based on revealed
preference arguments and extend the test to assess the validity of some less extreme oligopoly
models.  We use Ashenfelter and Sullivan’s approach to develop a similar test for monopsony market￿
power exertion.  The resulting test is the negative of the right-hand side term of their equation.  We
obtain results for both cases of the Ashenfelter and Sullivan test, but do not include data for the excise
tax term as in the original test.  See Appendix A for the empirical equations of all eight nonparametric
market power tests used in this study.
Raper, Love, and Shumway (1996b) revise Ashenfelter and Sullivan’s test to include input
parameters and use Love and Shumway’s (1994) method to account for structural shifts.  We use the
revisions for monopoly as well as for monopsony market power exertion.
Love and Shumway (1994) develop a nonparametric deterministic monopsony market power
test incorporating the possibility of Hicks-neutral technical change.  Raper, Love, and Shumway
(1996b) adapt Love and Shumway’s model to test for monopoly market power exertion.  These two
tests are also implemented.
The last two deterministic nonparametric market power tests utilized in this study use a very
similar approach to Love and Shumway.  However, instead of assuming positive as well as negative
Hicks-neutral technical change, only nonregressive technical change is admitted.  Assuming that
future technologies are not available in current or past periods, the search for violations of the
hypothesized behavior is restricted to the search over past periods.  This assumption is reasonable
when new technologies allow a firm to produce more output using the same amount of input or to
use less inputs to produce the same amount of output compared to the time before the introduction
of the new technology.  This approach is the basis for Raper, Love, and Shumway’s (1996a)
statistical nonparametric test for monopsony market power exertion, but has not been used before
for a deterministic nonparametric market power test.  The two tests based on the following empirical
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where in the first equation p  is the price of the upstream firm’s potentially monopolistically exerted u
output, y , w  and w  are the prices of the upstream firm’s inputs, z  and z , c  is an arbitrarily uu 1 u 2 u 1 u 2
ts
chosen weight, t and s indicate time, and mp  is the monopoly market power parameter.  In equation
ts
(2), p  is the price of downstream firm’s output, y , v  is the price of the downstream firm’s input x , dd d d
ms  is the monopsony market power parameter, and p  is the price of downstream firm’s potentially
ts
u
monopsonistically exerted input y  bought from the upstream firm. u
We compare the results for the above eight nonparametric market power tests with Raper,
Love, and Shumway’s (1997) results of three parametric market power tests in the Bresnahan-Lau
tradition (monopolistic, monopsonistic market power exertion, and FlexPower, a test developed by
Raper, Love, and Shumway(1997)).￿
DATA AND IMPLEMENTATION
Raper, Love, and Shumway (1997) simulate data for ten different market structures:
monopsony (MS), Stackelberg duopsony (SS), Cournot duopsony (CS), perfect competition (PC),
Cournot duopoly (CP), Stackelberg duopoly (SP), monopoly (MP), and three forms of cooperative
bilateral monopoly (buyer dominates (BMU), seller dominates (BML), and equal profit split (BM))
using a normalized quadratic functional form for the cost functions.  The industry-level data are
generated for 68 periods with exogenous variables held constant across alternative simulations.  1000
experiments are conducted for each market structure.  More specific details regarding the simulation
may be found in Raper, Love, and Shumway’s paper.
We implement each of the previously discussed nonparametric market power tests for the ten
market structures, using Raper, Love, and Shumway’s (1997) data set.  Ashenfelter and Sullivan’s
test as well as its modifications are calculated in SAS.  The four other nonparametric market power
tests require linear programming and are implemented using GAMS and the solver MINOS.
RESULTS
In this section we present the results of the nonparametric market power tests and compare
them to the results of Raper, Love, and Shumway’s study.  Results are obtained for each of the ten
market structures over 1000 simulations and for each market structure, the mean of the market power
parameter is calculated.
Ashenfelter and Sullivan Type Market Power Tests
In Ashenfelter and Sullivan’s monopoly market power test, comparisons of data more than
two periods apart are excluded from the calculation of the market power parameter, identifying these￿
PS
￿
PC MP CP SP MS CS SS BM BMU BML
Mean 86174 86046 100794 86413 11450 40257 49310 147347 121872 103974
CNE ￿ 1 63.64 69.91 41.49 42.07 18.55 47.86 53.55 56.07 61.04 41.32
CNE ￿ 2 83.56 84.73 61.59 63.05 39.93 71.53 75.87 72.89 78.64 57.94
CNE ￿ 3 89.84 89.95 71.90 73.63 52.56 81.52 84.48 80.99 85.67 68.25
CNE ￿ 4 92.65 92.50 77.99 79.64 60.78 86.49 88.79 85.55 89.21 74.80
CNE ￿ 5 94.18 94.07 81.95 83.34 66.76 89.54 91.24 88.36 91.40 79.20
CNE ￿ 6 95.21 95.03 84.66 85.88 71.29 91.49 92.84 90.29 92.85 82.33
CNE ￿ 7 95.92 95.72 86.71 87.78 74.91 92.82 93.93 91.64 93.79 84.63
CNE ￿ 8 96.50 96.26 88.24 89.26 77.82 93.79 94.75 92.71 94.56 86.51
CNE ￿ 9 96.92 96.68 89.43 90.42 80.15 94.51 95.38 93.45 95.18 87.98
CNE ￿
10000
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.00 100.00 87.98
Table 1.  Mean Value of Estimated Market Power Parameters (1000 Simulations) and Cumulative Cournot
Numbers Equivalents (CNE) for Original Ashenfelter and Sullivan Monopoly Market Power Test.
comparisons as structural shifts (4290 in each simulation).  Negative values of the market power
parameter are considered to be violations of profit maximization and thus also excluded.
Theoretically, the mean of the monopoly market power parameter (￿ ) should lie between zero and
mp
one, which is not the case for the calculated market power parameters for any of the ten market
structures.  Ashenfelter and Sullivan’s Cournot Numbers Equivalent (CNE) is calculated as 1/￿ .
mp
CNE represents the least number of firms with Cournot behavior that the investigated industry could
support.  As seen in Table 1, for the monopoly market structure, 92.5 % of the CNE’s are less or
equal four.  This indicates that 92.5 % of the data support the assumption that there are at the most
four Cournot firms in the industry.  The cumulative percentage of the data where the CNE is less than
one, less than two, etc. should increase more rapidly with high levels of monopoly market power￿
PS
￿
PC MP CP SP MS CS SS BM BMU BML
Mean 4.91 11.49
a 5.13 4.20 1.49
b 7.19 6.86 5.68 24.78 3.74
CNE ￿ 1 71.10 58.01 71.68 68.57 20.08 64.04 64.46 78.26 86.98 43.20
CNE ￿ 2 88.97 66.98 87.71 85.16 38.41 82.75 83.20 94.32 91.55 86.30
CNE ￿ 3 92.92 73.44 92.99 90.81 48.48 88.77 89.19 97.73 93.50 94.47
CNE ￿ 4 94.61 79.03 95.60 93.85 55.87 91.64 92.03 98.58 94.69 97.01
CNE ￿ 5 95.56 83.55 96.97 95.77 61.97 93.30 93.68 98.90 95.50 98.36
CNE ￿ 6 96.18 86.98 97.73 96.91 67.10 94.41 94.75 99.08 96.11 98.91
CNE ￿ 7 96.63 89.48 98.19 97.60 71.07 95.19 95.51 99.20 96.57 99.19
CNE ￿ 8 96.97 91.41 98.50 98.05 74.35 95.77 96.08 99.28 96.94 99.34
CNE ￿ 9 97.24 92.87 98.71 98.36 77.04 96.22 96.51 99.35 97.24 99.44
CNE ￿
10000
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Mean
Shifts
2243 3157 3029 2880 690 1729 1951 3051 3869 2966
Table 2.  Mean Value of Estimated Market Power Parameters (1000 Simulations) and Cumulative Cournot
Numbers Equivalents (CNE) for Revised Ashenfelter and Sullivan Monopoly Market Power Test (Raper,
Love, Shumway 1996b).
exertion.  For data representing market structures where low or no market power exertion is
expected, the size of the CNE should increase more slowly.  This is not the case for Ashenfelter and
Sullivan’s monopoly test.
Ashenfelter and Sullivan’s test modified to measure monopsony market power exertion
performs similarly.  The results reveal that only 56 % of the monopsony market structure data
actually support a CNE of four firms.  The largest support for a CNE of four firms is 90 % for the
monopoly data.  These two results should be switched to support the hypotheses behind the test.  See
Appendix B.1 for full results.  Thus Ashenfelter and Sullivan’s test represents an important step for
nonparametric market power tests, but our study supports the call for potential improvements as￿
Ashenfelter and Sullivan acknowledge in their paper.  It is possible that inadequately accounted for
information like measurement errors, technological change, or structural change might seriously bias
the estimates.  Also, the exclusion of all negative market power parameters from the calculation of
the CNE’s because they are assumed to be violations of profit maximization might be over-restrictive.
Assuming a reasonable tolerance level for small violations may improve results.
The results for Raper, Love, and Shumway’s revision of Ashenfelter and Sullivan’s test
measuring monopoly market power exertion are reported in Table 2.  The mean of the monopoly
market power parameter for each market structure decreased dramatically, except for the monopoly
and monopsony data.  After deleting two outliers (very high values for the market power parameter)
in the monopoly data and one outlier in the monopsony data, the mean of the market power
parameter decreases to reasonable values for both data sets.  However, more than 90 % of the data
support a CNE of four for all market structures except monopoly and monopsony.  Results from
oligopsony, perfect competition, or bilateral monopoly data should not bolster the assumption of
monopoly market power with such strength.
The revised monopsony market power test produces somewhat more plausible results.  For
monopsony data, 96 % of the observations support a monopsonistic CNE of four firms.  87 % of
Cournot duopsony market structure data supports a CNE of four, and 84 % of Stackelberg duopsony
data support a CNE of four.  However, for all other market structures, more than 76 % of the data
support the assumption of a four firm Cournot equivalent in the market.  This is still relatively higher
than expected, given that the remaining structures are either perfectly competitive, monopolistic, or
bilateral monopolistic rather than purely monopsonistic.  Thus, the revision of the Ashenfelter and
Sullivan monopoly market power test including input data and accounting differently for structural￿
shifts does not substantially improve estimates of the degree of market power.  See Appendix B.2 for
full results.
Love and Shumway Type Market Power Tests
Using the original Love and Shumway monopsony market power test, the mean of the market
power parameter (ms ) over 1000 simulations is significantly different from zero (p = 0.0001) for
ts
each market structure (Table 3).  For full results see Appendix B.3.  Theoretically, only the market
power parameters for monopsony, Cournot duopsony, and Stackelberg duopsony market structures
should be different from zero and close to their ‘true’ values.  With simulated data, we have the
luxury of knowing the true values of ms  for each structure and, thus, can test whether our estimates
ts
are statistically different from their true values.  The null hypothesis of the monopsony market power
parameter being equal to 2.06 is not rejected (p = 0.2775).  However, the Cournot ms  is significantly
ts
different from its true value of 0.78 (p = 0.0001).  The same is true of the Stackelberg duopsony ms ,
ts
where the true value is 0.46 (p = 0.0198).  Thus, the monopsony market power test detects
monopsony market power and in a magnitude which could be considered economically significant.
However, the test also detects some monopsony market power when oligopolistic data are used.  This
implies that the test works  well in identifying monopsony market power, but it is also very important
to correctly specify the model in terms of market power direction.
The Love and Shumway test modified by Raper, Love, and Shumway (1996b) to test for
monopoly market power does not perform quite as well (Table 4).  For full results see Appendix B.4.
Again, mean market power parameters for all market structures are significantly different from zero
(p = 0.0001).  For monopoly, Cournot duopoly, and Stackelberg duopoly data, which should be the
only parameters significantly different from zero and close to their ‘true’ values, the market power￿
PV ￿
PS
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￿￿
Table 3.  Mean Value of Estimated Market Power Table 4.  Mean Value of Estimated Market
Parameters (1000 Simulations) for Original Love and Power Parameters (1000 Simulations) for







PC 0.1869 0.0196 2316 PC 0.0367 0.0013 2240
MP 0.1206 0.0036 1396 MP 0.2036 0.0089 3160
CP 0.1464 0.0035 1524 CP 0.7292 0.0339 3032
SP 0.2207 0.0092 1674 SP 0.7354 0.0323 2882
MS 2.0965 0.0617 3867 MS 1.5954 0.0510 689
CS 0.5004 0.0284 2828 CS 0.1412 0.0024 1728
SS 0.4228 0.0180 2605 SS 0.1043 0.0020 1951
BM 0.0246 0.0009 1505 BM 0.0228 0.0007 3051
BMU 0.0065 0.0005 682 BMU 0.0641 0.0014 3874
BML 0.0684 0.0013 1589 BML 0.0195 0.0007 2967
parameters are also significantly different from their true market power values of 1.0 (p = 0.001), 0.5
(p = 1.2007E-11), and 0.4046 (p = 0.0001), respectively.  The values for Cournot duopoly and
Stackelberg duopoly are relatively large, thus indicating market power exertion.  However, the
market power estimate for monopoly is relatively small as compared to the duopoly cases while the
parameter for monopsony market power exertion is very large with 1.5954.  Theoretically it should
be near zero, while the monopoly market power parameter should be near 1.0.  Monopsony, Cournot
duopoly, and Stackelberg duopoly all have maximum market power values of a much greater






the market power values significantly and does not change the ‘switched’ values of the monopoly and
monopsony market structures.  Hence, Raper, Love, and Shumway’s monopoly market power test
works to a certain extent;  but again, the market structure specification of the model is very important
as the test detects some market power when market power is instead being exerted from the opposite
market.
Another modification of Love and Shumway’s test is developed in this paper and restricts
technical change to be nonregressive.  As no technical change parameters are estimated, a problem
similar to Ashenfelter and Sullivan’s test is encountered since any measurement error or similar biases
can only be detected by the market power parameter.  The results for the nonregressive monopsony
market power test point to such a problem, as all results are declared infeasible by the linear
programming solver.  Results for the nonregressive monopoly market power test were not obtained
because the test created problems with the solver that could not be alleviated.  The use of
nonregressive technical change is reasonable; however, it does not work in a linear programming
formulation.
Parametric Market Power Tests
Raper, Love, and Shumway (1997) report mean values and standard deviations of market
power parameters over 1000 simulations for a Bresnahan-Lau type monopoly market power test, a
monopsony market power test, and FlexPower, using the same data set as this study.  The ‘true’
values for   for Bresnahan-Lau type parametric market power tests are 1.0 for monopoly, 0.5 for
Cournot duopoly, and 0.4046 for Stackelberg duopoly.    should be equal to zero for all other
market structure data.  The ‘true’ values for  are 1.0 for monopsony, 0.5 for Cournot duopsony,
and 0.3956 for Stackelberg duopsony.  For all other market structures,   should be equal to zero.￿￿
Both the monopoly market power test and the monopsony market power test using the
Bresnahan-Lau approach perform remarkably well.  FlexPower combines the two uni-lateral market
power tests into one test that does not assume a priori one side of the market to be perfectly
competitive, but allows for either or both sides of the market to have some degree of market power.
FlexPower gives results similar to the monopoly and monopsony tests when considering the
significance of market power estimates.  Additionally, FlexPower is able to distinguish between
perfect competitive and bilateral monopoly data.
CONCLUSIONS
Knowledge of the degree of market power exertion is important in guiding antitrust and
merger policies.  With the help of Raper, Love, and Shumway’s (1997) results, this study compares
Bresnahan-Lau type parametric market power tests for monopoly market power exertion, monopsony
market power exertion, and bilateral market power exertion (FlexPower) with the relatively new
approach of deterministic nonparametric market power tests.  Ashenfelter and Sullivan’s test for
monopoly market power and its counterpart for monopsony market power as well as revisions of the
test proposed by Raper, Love, and Shumway (1996b) are implemented.  Additionally, Love and
Shumway’s monopsony test, its monopoly counterpart, as well as selected revisions are implemented
using Raper, Love, and Shumway’s (1997) Monte Carlo data set that simulates data for ten different
market structures.
Ashenfelter and Sullivan make a major contribution to the field by introducing the first
nonparametric market power test.  However, as they point out, their market power test might need
modifications.  This result is confirmed by this study.  The results are not satisfactory for the original￿￿
Ashenfelter and Sullivan monopoly market power test, the analogous monopsony market power test,
or Raper, Love, and Shumway’s (1996b) revisions for monopoly and monopsony market power.
This suggests that researchers should be hesitant about choosing Ashenfelter and Sullivan type tests
to measure the degree of market power exertion in an industry.
Love and Shumway’s monopsony market power test yields estimates close to the true value
on the downstream firm’s side.  However, to some extent the test incorrectly attributes upstream
market power to downstream firms.  This implies that Love and Shumway’s monopsony market
power test can be implemented under the restriction that the model is specified for the ‘right’
direction.  The monopoly market power test in Love and Shumway’s tradition performs less
accurately and should be implemented under the same restrictions.  This indicates that if there is any
potential for market power from the opposing side of the market, biased results may be obtained
unless proper modifications are made.  The revision of Love and Shumway’s test to account for
nonregressive technical change gives infeasible values for both the monopoly and the monopsony test.
All three parametric market power tests perform very well in Raper, Love, and Shumway’s
(1997) study.  FlexPower incorporates the monopoly and monopsony market power tests into one
test and performs equally well as the uni-lateral monopoly and monopsony market power tests,
suggesting that FlexPower should be implemented when choosing to perform a parametric market
power test.  However, as Hyde and Perloff (1994) point out, parametric market power tests can be
seriously biased when the functional form is misspecified.
Thus, the question remains as to which test to employ for investigation of market power.  Our
results suggest that parametric tests are less subject to misspecification bias with respect to direction
of market power and give more accurate estimates of market power but are sensitive to functional￿￿
form misspecification.  Though nonparametric tests do not perform as accurately as parametric tests
in this study, it should be noted again that the approach is relatively new.  The advantages presented,
such as relatively small data needs and no functional form bias, are perhaps sufficient for this
approach to merit further development.￿￿
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APPENDIX B.  RESULTS
B.1.  Mean Value of Estimated Market Power Parameters (1000 Simulations) and Cumulative Cournot Numbers
Equivalents (CNE) for Modified Ashenfelter and Sullivan Monopsony Market Power Test (Noelke and Raper)
PC MP CP SP MS CS SS BM BMU BML
Mean ￿ 211500 122459 47111 37931 31020 200558 109746 135182 166545 70672
ms
Mean CNE 5.83 4.18 4.82 4.91 41.13 9.98 8.34 5.88 5.80 8.42
CNE ￿ 1 58.22 66.49 32.34 32.02 26.00 46.85 50.13 56.84 55.69 45.75
CNE ￿ 2 74.21 81.21 67.92 69.70 40.46 64.22 67.59 73.37 74.07 65.55
CNE ￿ 3 81.47 87.05 81.48 82.94 49.90 73.32 76.23 81.29 81.93 74.67
CNE ￿ 4 85.49 90.14 87.01 88.23 56.35 78.72 81.36 85.74 86.21 80.25
CNE ￿ 5 88.17 92.05 89.91 90.91 61.24 82.33 84.63 88.52 88.79 84.02
CNE ￿ 6 89.95 93.30 91.76 92.62 65.08 84.91 86.91 90.38 90.58 86.63
CNE ￿ 7 91.32 94.29 92.99 93.73 68.15 86.89 88.57 91.70 91.90 88.49
CNE ￿ 8 92.35 94.99 93.92 94.57 70.70 88.42 89.94 92.67 92.89 89.87
CNE ￿ 9 93.15 95.51 94.62 95.21 72.90 89.63 90.92 93.47 93.66 90.96
CNE ￿ 10000 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
# Neg ￿ 188 156 83 84 199 184 184 128 153 106
ms
# Pos ￿ 78 110 183 182 67 82 82 138 113 160
ms￿￿
B.2.  Mean Value of Estimated Market Power Parameters (1000 Simulations) and Cumulative Cournot Numbers
Equivalents (CNE) for Revised Ashenfelter and Sullivan Monopsony Market Power Test (Raper, Love, and 
Shumway, 1996b)
PC MP CP SP MS CS SS BM BMU BML
Mean ￿ 4.94 5.60 2.28 2.23 16.21 10.01 7.98 3.00 4.40 2.60
ms
Mean CNE 16.70 15.37 15.42 13.87 2.61 12.32 8.97 10.59 55.45 31.34
CNE ￿ 1 46.69 49.76 37.11 39.33 83.85 62.66 57.54 47.26 41.32 40.01
CNE ￿ 2 62.96 64.91 62.70 65.11 91.60 76.76 72.61 68.30 50.40 61.75
CNE ￿ 3 71.14 72.32 73.08 74.88 94.26 82.93 79.80 77.39 58.94 71.34
CNE ￿ 4 76.12 77.16 78.45 80.02 95.62 86.49 83.93 82.18 65.11 76.42
CNE ￿ 5 79.61 80.31 82.01 83.24 96.43 88.85 86.64 85.25 69.84 79.54
CNE ￿ 6 82.14 82.78 84.47 85.51 97.01 90.48 88.53 87.35 73.40 81.71
CNE ￿ 7 84.20 84.71 86.28 87.18 97.42 91.72 89.99 88.77 76.12 83.45
CNE ￿ 8 85.69 86.16 87.71 88.57 97.74 92.68 91.13 89.86 78.35 84.82
CNE ￿ 9 86.99 87.40 88.88 89.66 97.99 93.44 92.03 90.72 80.25 85.98
CNE ￿ 10000 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.99 100.00
Mean Shifts 2308 1395 1524 1674 3845 2822 2600 1504 680 1588
# Neg ￿ 2183 3076 2807 2658 257 1548 1797 2989 3842 2855
ms
# Pos ￿ 60 84 224 224 432 181 154 63 32 112
ms￿￿
B.3.  Mean Value of Estimated Market Power Parameters (1000 Simulations) for Original Love and Shumway 
Monopsony Market Power Test.
PC MP CP SP MS CS SS BM BMU BML
Mean ￿ 0.1869 0.1206 0.1464 0.2207 2.0965 0.5004 0.4228 0.0246 0.0065 0.0684
ms
0.0196 0.0036 0.0035 0.0092 0.0617 0.0284 0.0181 0.0009 0.0005 0.0015
a
St. Dev. 0.6197 0.1140 0.1117 0.2904 1.9524 0.8980 0.5706 0.0293 0.0169 0.0395
p-value 0.2775 0.0000 0.0198
bcd
Min ￿ 0.0466 0.0425 0.0756 0.0917 -2.6982 0.1599 0.1309 0.0138 0.0011 0.0523
ms
Max ￿ 18.29 2.40 1.88 5.22 24.98 25.13 7.59 0.62 0.45 0.87
ms
Mean Pos. 2.55 2.12 4.24 4.58 1.56 3.93 3.99 2.86 3.30 2.46
Tech. Change
Mean Neg. 3.12 2.63 3.09 2.98 0.92 2.34 2.59 3.02 4.42 2.12
Tech. Change
Mean Shifts 2316 1396 1524 1674 3867 2828 2605 1505 682 1589
Model status equals for all simulations ‘globally optimal.’
 Standard errors of mean market power parameters (St.Dev/￿N).
a
 Null hypothesis is that mean market power parameter is equal to 2.06, the true value.
b
 Null hypothesis is that mean market power parameter is equal to 0.78, the true value.
c
 Null hypothesis is that mean market power parameter is equal to 0.46, the true value.
d￿￿
B.4.  Mean Value of Estimated Market Power Parameters (1000 Simulations) for Modified Love and Shumway Monopoly 
Market Power Test (Raper, Love, and Shumway 1996b).
PC MP CP SP MS CS SS BM BMU BML
Mean ￿ 0.0367 0.2036 0.7292 0.7354 1.5954 0.1412 0.1043 0.0228 0.0641 0.0195
mp
0.0013 0.0089 0.0339 0.0323 0.0510 0.0024 0.0020 0.0007 0.0014 0.0007
a
St. Dev. 0.0404 0.2805 1.0727 1.0225 1.6141 0.0751 0.0635 0.0208 0.0445 0.02
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
bcd
Min ￿ 0.0145 0.0423 0.1243 0.1301 -35.5356 0.0603 0.0450 0.0024 0.0105 0.00
mp
Max ￿ 1.24 5.25 16.57 14.60 29.35 1.85 1.37 0.23 0.72 0.26
mp
Mean Pos. 2.36 1.20 1.31 1.65 2.02 1.67 1.64 1.65 0.95 1.71
Tech. Change
Mean Neg. 1.12 0.35 0.64 0.63 1.91 1.82 1.98 0.91 0.63 0.93
Tech. Change
Mean Shifts 2240 3160 3032 2882 689 1728 1951 3051 3874 2967
Model status equals for all simulations ‘globally optimal.’
 Standard errors of mean market power parameters (St.Dev/￿N).
a
 Null hypothesis is that market power parameter is equal to 1.00, the true value.
b
 Null hypothesis is that market power parameter is equal to 0.50, the true value.
c
 Null hypothesis is that market power parameter is equal to 0.4046, the true value.
d